The 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) is a significant regional treaty under which eight protocols have been developed. The Convention offers a case study on the legal and political challenges that can occur when addressing air pollution. This article explores the recent history of the CLRTAP regime, drawing on the conceptual lens of regime effectiveness. First, the article considers how the legal framework has been modernized over the past decade to reflect changes in the sources and effects of air pollution. This has predominantly occurred through amendments to the 1999 Protocol to Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and GroundLevel Ozone, the 1998 Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the 1998 Protocol on Heavy Metals, which were negotiated in 2009-2012. The amendments are an important point in the regime's history, as they set more stringent pollution limits. Particular attention is paid to their prospective entry into force and their broader impact on European law. Second, the geographic coverage of the legal instruments has long been an issue of concern, with a number of former Soviet Union States choosing to not participate in the pollution-specific protocols. The article reviews efforts to boost participation through the creation in 2011 of a coordinating group to promote action in the countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Third, the article explores recent developments in compliance and inventory adjustments under the Gothenburg Protocol, as a demonstration of how the system approaches changes in scientific knowledge on the sources and levels of air pollution, and how this affects compliance.
| INTRODUCTION
The 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) 1 is fast approaching its 40th anniversary since its signing and has been in force for just under 35 years. The Convention was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), an organization that was set up to aid the reconstruction and redevelopment of Europe after the Second World War. 2 In practical terms, the UNECE attempts to tie together a heterogeneous range of geopolitical groupings: North America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and parts of West and Central Asia. The Convention therefore has the potential to extend transboundary air pollution law over a geographic range of 47 million square kilometres, encompassing 20 percent of the world population.
In this shorter article, I focus on recent developments under the regime (focusing on the past 10 years), and return to three areas of concern -entry into force, State participation and compliance.
| Entry into force
A central argument was that for an environmental treaty to be legally effective, there would need to be high levels of compliance with ambitious and precise commitments, although a close reading of the history of the regime suggested that soft law and institutional innovations can bolster participation and improve environmental effectiveness over the long term. 16 These amendments attempted to improve the legal framework and reflect changes in the sources and effects of air pollution, potentially
improving the air quality of the UNECE region. The analytical framework of legal effectiveness does not, however, adequately address issues of entry into force. The amendments and their entry into force must therefore be given prominence in any effectiveness assessment as their legal status reflects momentum, legitimacy and
State support for multilateral action on transboundary air pollution;
this also enables formal assessments of compliance.
| State participation
The geographic coverage of the legal instruments has long been an issue of concern, with a number of the former Soviet Union States choosing to not participate in the pollution-specific protocols adopted after the end of the Cold War. I have previously argued that 'state participation is a key area where the regime needs to make substantial improvements'. 20 Subdivided into (i) the commitments and compliance; (ii) the use of binding/non-binding instruments; (iii) the precision of the rules; and (iv) the implementation strategies. 14 Focusing on (i) the core institutions; and (ii) the international implementation procedures, which included dispute settlement and reporting, review and non-compliance procedures. 15 Subdivided into (i) legitimacy and the rules on decision making and participation; (ii) State participation; (iii) the assignment of implementation responsibilities; (iv) the degree of burden sharing and financial assistance; and (v) the empowerment of domestic stakeholders. consider the efforts to boost participation through the creation in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA). Having now existed for six years, enough time has passed to make some tentative conclusions as to whether this approach has improved participation.
| Compliance
This article explores the recent history of compliance and inventory adjustments under the Gothenburg Protocol, as a demonstration of how the system approaches changes in scientific knowledge on the sources and levels of air pollution. I suggest that an assessment of compliance should be read more broadly than simply the achievement of the objectives as approved by expert assessments and/or implementation committees, but rather should include some discussion of the manner in which States reached compliance, and whether this is in keeping with the spirit of the law and broader environmental principles. Nitrogen dioxide emissions have also declined markedly, although perhaps less spectacularly, reducing from~29 million t/y in 1990 to~17 million t/y presently. 32 Emissions of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), heavy metal pollution and POPs have also declined, and there is also growing evidence that implementing the CLRTAP protocols may have contributed to modest reductions in carbon dioxide.
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The UNECE was an extremely useful institutional home for tackling certain types of transboundary air pollution, such as acid rain, which fitted, or could be made to fit, into its boundaries. Choosing to adhere to these membership criteria was diplomatically shrewd given its East-West membership, and politically convenient given the limited interest in tackling the problem on a global scale at the time. 34 The CLRTAP reflects how the problem was being approached, by scientists and politicians, as a regional problem rather than a global one. 35 The membership criteria have become a limitation in recent years, however, as the hemispheric nature of POPs, mercury, ozone and particulate matter mean that the CLRTAP protocols which address these pollutants can only ever be partially successful, and points towards the need for global approaches to air pollution. 36 Discussions on whether the CLRTAP could be opened up to non-UNECE States were unsuccessful in the mid-2000s. 37 The Global Atmospheric Pollution Forum (GAP From the 1990s onwards, the policy focus broadened out from ecosystem protection to include human health co-benefits (e.g., particulate matter) and the range of sectors that received attention also expanded (e.g., agriculture). A major achievement for the regime was the adoption of amendments to the late 1990s protocols. These were of key importance because they extended the framework to 2020 and beyond, increased the stringency of the commitments and incorporated more chemicals. The outlook for the amendments which require the parties to formally accept them (e.g., the emissions targets) is somewhat Recently, the EB has tasked an ad hoc group of legal experts to 'provide advice on the legal implications of the ratification by a State of an amended protocol to the Convention by a State not Party to the original protocol, before the amendments have entered into force'. The group concluded that '[i]f non-Party States choose to ratify the Protocols in question and upon ratification declare that they only ratify the amended version of the Protocols, this would mean that they would not be Parties to the Protocols until the amendments entered into force. Their ratifications could not therefore be counted towards the number of acceptances necessary to bring the amendments into force.' UNECE 'Ratifi- and also experienced a strong lobby from industry, agriculture 69 and some governments (e.g., the United Kingdom (UK)), that led to the European Commission's proposals being watered down. 70 The EB has maintained focus on the amendments and from indi- Mediterranean countries do not participate; it may be that because the region is not completely represented by the UNECE boundary, 85 States have a disincentive to take on the commitments, or it may be that Turkey's indifference to LRTAP has therefore diminished political will in the surrounding region. 86 Cyprus is somewhat of an outlier, having ratified the later protocols, but the absence of Greece, Israel, Malta and Turkey leaves most of the region outside the scope of the late 1990s
protocols.
The recent history of the developments under the CLRTAP suggest that the past 10 years have been something of an impasse with regards to State participation. The lack of substantial financial incentives for the EECCA countries may be a contributing factor, but it is unlikely that in the future mechanisms will be established beyond the development support already offered by Western parties. 87 It is entirely possible that in the short to medium term (for the next 20 years) the Eastern UNECE region will remain outside the scope of the protocols. The UNECE and the EB of the CLRTAP need to reconsider how they interact with the EECCA States if any progress is to be made, in particular by creating a more dynamic approach that enables front runners in the EECCA to emerge. This may increase the application of transboundary air pollution law across the entire bloc. The 2012 Amendments to the Gothenburg Protocol 96 contained an enhanced adjustment process, allowing the application of 'adjustments to emission reduction commitments, or to inventories for the purposes of comparing total national emissions with them', which can be applied in extraordinary circumstances when 'such a circumstance contributes to a Party being unable to meet one of its reduction commitments contained in annex II'. 97 The EB decided to bend the rules for these amendments and provisionally act upon them without the required instruments of acceptance being received. 98 The process is overseen by the EMEP Centre on Emission Inventories and Projections were not accounted for when the emission reduction commitment was set; (ii) a significant difference in emission factors for source categories between when the emission reduction commitments were set and when they were to be attained; 100 and (iii) significant changes in the methodologies for determining emissions from specific sources between the time that emission reduction commitments were set and when they are to be achieved.
| ADJUSTMENTS UNDER THE 1999 GOTHENBUR G PR OTOCOL
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The basic idea with adjustments is given developments in know- 110 After the adjustment of its data, Belgium appeared to be in compliance for both NO x and NMVOCs. 111 Spain appeared to be in compliance for its 2010 NO x commitment after adjustment. 112 It has not been completely plain sailing, however: the Croatian submission was not seen as sufficiently extraordinary to warrant acceptance. 113 As a result of these adjustments, the Implementation Committee closed its investigations into Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Spain. 114 From a legal effectiveness approach which prioritizes compliance, the adjustment process and the subsequent shift to compliance is an indicator of success. It would not be helpful to the parties or the regime if the impression was given that compliance was being achieved through obscure technocratic adjustments. Because the technical assessment is overseen by experienced experts in emission inventories, the process has credibility. Having said this, the CEIP struggled with the initial workload and the adjustment procedure appears to have had a wider impact on the regime. The procedure did not come with its own funding source; consequently, limited EMEP resources were spent on reviewing the applications, and this contributed to the CEIP being unable to complete all its tasks in the 2014-2015 work plan for the implementation of the Convention. 115 The fundamental problem is that the sectoral data for emissions is not the evidence of monitoring for every single source or installation, as this is not possible, but will only ever be the best available data at a given time derived from supposedly representative sampling. 116 Reviewing the inventory sectors is therefore a time-consuming affair and a continuous process to improve emission data quality.
Through the adjustment procedure technical data and scientific 
